The bilateral relationship between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of India is arguably one of the most significant dynamics shaping the 21st century. While official statements often emphasize cooperation and a shared future, a close examination of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) strategic orientation, ideological commitments, and geopolitical conduct makes clear that Beijing will not willingly permit India to achieve strategic parity. This paper advances the argument that the CCP’s core objective—the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” culminating in unchallenged global primacy—is fundamentally incompatible with the emergence of a strong, democratic peer on its southern flank. Through a multi-dimensional approach involving military coercion, economic leverage, strategic encirclement, and ideological contestation, China actively seeks to preserve a durable power imbalance vis-à-vis India. For Beijing, an India at equal footing would not only challenge its regional dominance but also project a democratic alternative to authoritarian governance, thereby undermining the CCP’s central ambitions. Accordingly, this study examines the principal elements of China’s containment strategy and concludes that while tactical pauses and periods of détente may occur, the long-term objective of denying India peer status is a non-negotiable feature of CCP policy.
1. Introduction: The Dragon and the Elephant in a Changing Order
The post-Cold War international system has been defined by major shifts in global power distribution, the most consequential of which is China’s rise. Within just a few decades, the PRC has transformed from a developing state into the world’s second-largest economy and a formidable military actor, directly contesting U.S. primacy. Parallel to this, India, the world’s largest democracy, has pursued rapid economic growth and enhanced strategic visibility.
The concurrent rise of these two civilizational states, sharing a 3,488-kilometer disputed frontier, has generated a relationship marked by both engagement and rivalry. Superficially, there are incentives for cooperation: both countries identify with the “Global South,” advocate reform of global governance institutions, and engage in multilateral platforms such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Trade between them is also substantial.
Yet beneath this surface pragmatism lies a widening strategic gulf. The 2020 Galwan Valley clash—the deadliest confrontation in over four decades—shattered the myth of a peaceful bilateral rise and underscored the hard edges of their rivalry. This paper argues that such episodes are not anomalies but the logical outcome of a sustained CCP strategy aimed at constraining India’s ascent and ensuring it does not evolve into a full peer competitor.
2. The Geopolitical Chessboard: Military Coercion and Encirclement
2.1 The Border Dispute as Perpetual Pressure
The unresolved boundary dispute is far more than a technical disagreement over maps; it serves as Beijing’s most effective lever against New Delhi. By deliberately leaving the Line of Actual Control (LAC) ambiguous and periodically initiating confrontations, the CCP ensures India remains under constant military strain. This compels India to allocate vast financial and military resources to its land frontier, limiting its ability to prioritize naval modernization and broader Indo-Pacific power projection. China’s extensive infrastructure development in the Tibet Autonomous Region—including airfields, highways, and railways leading up to the LAC—enables rapid deployment of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), further consolidating its positional advantage in the high Himalayas.
2.2 The “String of Pearls” and Maritime Encirclement
China has extended this competition beyond the continental theater into the maritime domain through what is often termed the “String of Pearls” strategy. By cultivating access to strategic ports and facilities across the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), Beijing seeks to constrain India’s maritime maneuverability. Notable examples include:
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Gwadar, Pakistan: A critical node of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), potentially providing the PLA Navy with access to the Arabian Sea.
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Hambantota, Sri Lanka: A port leased to a Chinese state-owned enterprise for 99 years after Sri Lanka’s debt distress.
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Chittagong, Bangladesh: Increasing Chinese investment in port development and defense cooperation.
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Kyaukpyu, Myanmar: A port and pipeline hub granting China a direct outlet to the Bay of Bengal.
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Djibouti: China’s first overseas military base at a key chokepoint in the Red Sea.
This maritime network secures China’s energy lifelines while simultaneously enabling intelligence collection, naval presence, and political influence across the IOR—thereby undermining India’s long-standing role as the region’s net security provider.
3. The Economic Front: Structural Asymmetry and Leverage
Economics constitutes another major front in China’s containment strategy. Although bilateral trade figures suggest interdependence, the imbalance overwhelmingly favors China, creating vulnerabilities for India. New Delhi’s dependence on Beijing for critical imports—such as Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs), electronics, and rare earths—grants China potential coercive leverage. Precedents, such as the 2010 rare earth export restrictions against Japan, highlight Beijing’s readiness to weaponize supply chains.
Additionally, China’s state-driven industrial policies enable it to flood the Indian market with low-cost, subsidized products, undermining domestic industry and complicating India’s “Make in India” agenda. In the technology sector, firms such as Huawei and ZTE embody dual-use risks—serving both commercial and intelligence purposes. Given the CCP’s prioritization of technological supremacy as a cornerstone of great-power status, it is committed to constraining India’s growth in advanced industries.
4. The Ideological Divide: Democracy Versus Authoritarianism
The rivalry between India and China also unfolds in the ideological domain. The CCP legitimizes its monopoly on power by asserting that its one-party authoritarian model is superior to the perceived instability of liberal democracy. India, however, as the most populous democracy, offers a living counterexample. A prosperous, resilient, and democratic India would disprove the CCP’s claims, demonstrating that development and national power can be achieved without authoritarian control.
For this reason, China views India not only as a strategic competitor but as an existential ideological challenge. Beijing’s propaganda organs frequently depict Indian democracy as chaotic, highlight internal social divisions, and amplify narratives of instability in an effort to weaken India’s global democratic image.
5. The Vision of a Sino-Centric Asia
At the heart of the CCP’s foreign policy lies the pursuit of the “great rejuvenation” of the Chinese nation, envisioned as a Sino-centric regional order where Beijing holds uncontested primacy. This inherently unipolar conception of Asia excludes the possibility of another power of equal standing. Within this vision, India—and other regional actors—are expected to accommodate China’s “core interests” rather than assert independent agendas.
Were India to attain economic, military, and technological parity, it could organize and lead balancing coalitions with states like Japan, Vietnam, and Australia, thereby fostering a multipolar Asia. Such a scenario directly threatens China’s strategic ambitions. Consequently, China’s policies toward India—ranging from border brinkmanship to port development and diplomatic framing—are systematically designed to obstruct the emergence of such a balance.
6. Conclusion: Rivalry Under Management, Not Equality
The cumulative evidence indicates that the CCP’s strategic calculus is centered on preventing India from achieving peer status. China’s pursuit of regional hegemony, its manipulation of economic asymmetries, its employment of military coercion and encirclement, and its fundamental ideological opposition to democracy collectively constitute a coherent long-term strategy of containment.
For Indian policymakers and their strategic partners, this reality must serve as the baseline in approaching China. While dialogue and crisis management remain vital for avoiding accidental escalation, the notion of a genuine strategic partnership or an equal condominium in Asia is illusory. Beijing may at times moderate its posture for tactical reasons, but it will not relinquish its overarching goal: ensuring that the Indian “Elephant” never rises to stand eye-to-eye with the Chinese “Dragon.” India’s ascent to great-power status will thus be realized not through Chinese accommodation, but in spite of Beijing’s determined resistance.
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